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The Right to Remain Anonymous:  Anonymous Speakers, 






In the digital age, the news media gives voice to anonymous speakers in two 
ways:  reporters may extend confidentiality to sources in exchange for newsworthy 
information, or a news website may host an online comment function that allows 
readers to post their reactions to content pseudonymously.1  Of these two groups of 
anonymous speakers, only online posters enjoy certain First Amendment protection 
against a subpoena seeking disclosure of their identities. 
The reporter’s privilege has always been legally defined as the professional 
privilege of a reporter to maintain the confidentiality of his sources.2  Yet as with 
all evidentiary privileges, the reporter’s privilege serves both private and public 
ends.3  Historically, state statutes and state common law have protected the private 
arrangement that enables sources to disclose information without fear of reprisal, 
and journalists to gain newsworthy content, because this relationship furthers the 
free flow of information to the public.4  By contrast, protection for anonymous 
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   1. Newspapers usually require that letters to the editor be signed, eliminating anonymity from 
this mode of commentary.  Historically, however, letters to the editor and other commentary did not 
have to be signed.  One historian has noted that “must-sign” policies were not widely instituted until the 
1950s and 1960s, as a means to deter “haters and hollerers from cluttering up the column and scaring off 
other writers.”  See Bill Reader, We the (Anonymous) People, AM. JOURNALISM REV., Sept. 22, 2010, at 
17. 
 2. In Branzburg v. Hayes, the only Supreme Court case to take up the issue of whether a 
reporter’s privilege exists under the First Amendment, the Court explicitly noted that “the privilege 
claimed is that of the reporter, not the informant.”  408 U.S. 665, 695 (1972).  The 39 states that have 
enacted reporters’ shield laws also locate the privilege with the reporter.  To access an explanation of 
state shield laws, see THE REPORTER’S PRIVILEGE COMPENDIUM, http://www.rcfp.org/privilege/ (follow 
hyperlinks to each state, then reference item IV.B of each state’s reporter’s privilege outline, “Whose 
privilege is it?”) (last visited May 11, 2011). 
 3. See Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 11 (1996).  See also Colin Miller, A Public Privilege, 118 
YALE L.J. POCKET PART 166 (2009), available at http://thepocketpart.org/ylj-online/professional-
responsibility/750-a-public-privilege (forcefully emphasizing the public benefit derived from the 
reporter’s privilege and arguing that “all evidentiary privileges must serve two masters”). 
 4. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 725 (Stewart, J., dissenting).  See also infra notes 67–75 and 
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speakers has always been rooted in the First Amendment under a concern that 
forced identification may chill speech on public issues, and would violate the 
principle of speaker autonomy.5   
Yet the distinction between the speech activity of confidential news sources and 
anonymous political speakers is not as sharp as history would draw it.6  One might 
consider a reporter “the surrogate of the third party speaker who wishes to remain 
anonymous.”7  Under this view, a source’s interest in anonymity is “qualitatively 
different and far more compelling than [the interests] of a reporter” because 
revelation of the source’s identity exposes the source to political reprisal, while 
only damaging the reporter’s future capacity for newsgathering.8 
The framing of the reporter’s privilege as reporter-based has come under 
scrutiny in recent years, as some commentators have argued that courts afford more 
protection to anonymous posters than confidential sources.9  For example, virtually 
all plaintiffs seeking to unmask an online poster must make a prima facie showing 
of the merits of their claim against the poster before they can abridge the poster’s 
First Amendment right to anonymity.10  Yet, under the reporter’s privilege analysis 
in most jurisdictions, courts need not inquire into the strength of the claim of a 
plaintiff subpoenaing the identity of a reporter’s confidential source.11  Moreover, 
one of the dominant tests for unmasking online speakers, first articulated in 
Dendrite International Inc. v. Doe, requires courts to “balance the defendant’s First 
Amendment right of anonymous free speech against the strength of the prima facie 
case presented and the necessity for the disclosure of the anonymous defendant’s 
identity.”12  No such First Amendment balancing test has ever been articulated by a 
court applying a qualified reporter’s privilege, because the privilege is framed as 
the reporter’s right to protect the confidentiality of his source, rather than the 
 
accompanying text. 
 5. See infra notes 55–58 and accompanying text. 
 6. See James C. Goodale, COMMUNICATIONS LAW IN THE DIGITAL AGE 2008 145, 155 (PLI 
Practice, Course Handbook, 2008) [hereinafter Recent Developments 2007–2008]. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Note, The Rights of Sources—The Critical Element in the Clash over the Reporter’s Privilege, 
88 YALE L.J. 1202, 1204 (1979) [hereinafter The Rights of Sources]. 
 9. See George Freeman, Vice President and Assistant Gen. Counsel for the New York Times, 
Remarks at the Practicing Law Institute’s seminar Communications Law in the Digital Age 2010:  
Reporter’s Privilege and Anonymous Speech (Nov. 11, 2010). 
 10. See Recent Developments 2007–2008, supra note 6, at 155–56.   
 11. Id.  Goodale and his coauthors have not only noted this discrepancy but also further 
questioned, without answering, whether consistently imposing a requirement of prima facie or summary 
judgment level evidence on those who would seek to reveal a confidential source would result in “less 
risk of litigants going on ‘fishing expeditions’ for information covered by the reporter’s privilege.”  See 
id. at 156. 
 12. Dendrite Int’l Inc. v. Doe No. 3, 775 A.2d 756, 76061 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).  
Courts outside of New Jersey that have applied the Dendrite test include federal and state courts in 
California, New Hampshire, Connecticut, Arizona and North Carolina.  See, e.g., Mobilisa, Inc. v. Doe 
1, 170 P.3d 712 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007); Doe I v. Individuals, 561 F. Supp. 2d 249 (D. Conn. 2008); 
Highfields Capital Mgmt. L.P. v. Doe, 385 F. Supp. 2d 969 (N.D. Cal. 2004); Mortg. Specialists, Inc. v. 
Implode-Explode Heavy Indus., Inc., 999 A.2d 184 (N.H. 2010); Hester v. Does, No. 10-CVS-361 (N.C. 
Sup. Ct. June 28, 2010). 
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source’s First Amendment right to speak anonymously.13  Jurisdictions which 
include a discretionary balancing element in their reporter’s privilege analysis 
weigh the strength of the public interest in maintaining reporter-source 
confidentiality against the plaintiff’s need to identify the source.14 
Given the discrepancy between the Dendrite test for unmasking online posters 
and the reporter’s privilege analysis, the assistant general counsel for the New York 
Times, George Freeman, has lamented that: 
In the case of a typical third party poster on your community forum, there’s no 
contract, there’s not even any contact between [the newspaper] and the third party 
poster, and . . . the speech that is engaged in is often scurrilous, false, defamatory, and 
otherwise irrelevant to real news.  Why is it that the courts seem to be as, if not more, 
protective of speech of an anonymous poster than in the reporter-source 
relationship?15 
Freeman’s critique highlights a frustration with the few jurisdictions that have 
chosen to treat anonymous commentary on news websites as the legal equivalent of 
information shared in the context of a reporter-source relationship, protecting the 
identity of online commenters under the state’s reporter’s shield law.16  Critiques 
such as Freeman’s also raise the question of whether the law is more protective on 
the whole of online posters than of journalists seeking to preserve the anonymity of 
their sources.  Would the reporter’s privilege be strengthened if it—like the 
Dendrite standard—required a balancing of the First Amendment rights of the 
confidential speaker against the strength of the subpoenaing party’s claim?17  
Taking the Dendrite model one step further, would the reporter’s privilege be 
strengthened by reframing it as the privilege of the source to speak anonymously, 
 
 13. See Recent Developments 2007–2008, supra note 6, at 155 (summarizing the reporter’s 
privilege analysis as turning on the “relevance of the information sought, the criticality of the 
information to proving the plaintiff’s claim, exhaustion of alternative sources and, in some jurisdictions, 
the viability of the claim”). 
 14. See Mitchell v. Superior Ct., 690 P.2d 625, 634 (Cal. 1984) (reasoning that 
[t]he investigation and revelation of hidden criminal or unethical conduct is one of the most 
important roles of the press in a free societya role that may depend upon the ability of the 
press and the courts to protect sources who may justifiably fear exposure and possible retaliation.  
Thus when the information relates to matters of great public importance, and when the risk of 
harm to the source is a substantial one, the court may refuse to require disclosure even though the 
plaintiff has no other way of obtaining essential information.). 
See also Bruno & Stillman, Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 633 F.2d 583, 597 (1st Cir. 1980) (“Assuming 
. . . that the case does not appear frivolous . . . and that the desired information appears more than 
remotely relevant, the court must assess the extent to which there is a need for confidentiality.”). 
 15. See supra note 9. 
 16. See infra note 127 and accompanying text. 
 17. While there are many tests for unmasking anonymous posters that are less protective than the 
Dendrite test (e.g., the tests set out in Doe No. 1 v. Cahill and Columbia Insurance Company v. 
Seescandy.com), this Note will primarily use the Dendrite test as a point of comparison with the 
reporter’s privilege, since one of the aims of this Note is to analyze whether the unmasking cases, at 
their most protective, are any more protective on average than the qualified reporter’s privilege cases. 
See Doe No. 1 v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451 (Del. 2005); Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 
573 (N.D. Cal. 1999). 
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rather than the professional privilege of the reporter to gather news?18  Paul Levy, 
chief architect of the Dendrite test, suggested just such a reframing after hearing 
Freeman and other media lawyers’ concerns at a practitioner seminar in November 
2010.19  “We created our [Dendrite] standard out of your source cases,” Levy 
acknowledged.20  “There’s no reason why we shouldn’t go backwards.”21 
While several commentators have seized upon the diversity of legal standards 
for unmasking online anonymous posters and have subsequently proposed a 
uniform one—and still others have proposed that a uniform standard be adopted 
with respect to all anonymous poster and confidential source cases—there has yet 
to be a probing analysis of whether courts’ differing approaches to subpoenas to 
identify an online speaker and subpoenas to identify a confidential news source 
makes sense from a policy standpoint.22  This Note will examine the wisdom of 
“going backwards,” or privileging the confidential source’s First Amendment right 
to anonymous speech, rather than the newsgatherer’s right to maintain confidential 
source relationships.  It will argue that it is crucial to preserve, as the animus 
behind the reporter’s privilege, the reporter-source relationship and the public 
benefit of the free flow of information that this association enables.  Part I of this 
Note will set out as background the historical development of the legal rights of 
anonymous speakers, both in traditional media and online, as well as the divergent 
development of the reporter’s privilege.  Part II will compare key cases concerning 
the reporter’s privilege and cases in which Internet service providers (ISPs) and 
news websites have asserted third party standing to protect the First Amendment 
 
 18. This argument had in fact been advanced in the aftermath of the Supreme Court’s decision 
that the First Amendment does not provide a shield, qualified or otherwise, to journalists from having to 
testify to a grand jury where that testimony may divulge the names of anonymous sources.  See 
generally Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).  See also The Rights of Sources, supra note 8, at 
1203–04 (arguing that “a source’s interests . . . are qualitatively different and far more compelling than 
those of a reporter,” and that “proper consideration of the interests of sources compels courts to use a 
different analytic approach and grant sources greater protection than was provided in Branzburg . . .”). 
 19. Paul Levy, Att’y, Pub, Citizen Litig. Grp., Remarks at the Practicing Law Institute’s seminar 
Communications Law in the Digital Age 2010:  Reporter’s Privilege and Anonymous Speech (Nov. 11, 
2010). 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. While one commentator has argued that reporter’s privilege analyses should incorporate not 
only the rights of the newsgatherer but also the First Amendment rights of the confidential source qua 
anonymous speaker, this argument was advanced before the online poster cases had arisen and created 
controversy over the rights of anonymous speakers.  See sources cited supra note 8 and accompanying 
text.  One commentator has raised the discrepancy between newsgatherer privileges and First 
Amendment rights of anonymous speakers as a “doctrinal inconsistency” in anonymous speech 
jurisprudence, but went no further in analyzing the desirability of this discrepancy from a policy 
standpoint than arguing that the two analyses ought to be uniform in order to “facilitate[] more accurate 
litigant expectations . . . [which] in turn, [will] . . . reduce the risk of a chilling effect . . . .”  Amy 
Pomerantz Nickerson, Comment, Coercive Discovery and the First Amendment:  Towards a Heightened 
Discoverability Standard, 57 UCLA L. REV. 841, 879–80 (2010).  Still another commentator has raised 
the narrow question of whether the journalist’s privilege ought to be applied to subpoenas to identify 
anonymous posters to news media websites, but did not advance a conclusion on this issue.  See Jane E. 
Kirtley, Mask, Shield, and Sword:  Should the Journalist’s Privilege Protect the Identity of Anonymous 
Posters to News Media Websites?, 94 Minn. L. Rev. 1478, 151013 (2010). 
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rights of their subscribers and commenters.  It will show that, in some 
circumstances, online commenters do enjoy stronger legal protection than reporters 
and their sources.  However, from this comparison, this Note will conclude that the 
reporter’s privilege would not be strengthened by decoupling the interests of the 
source from those of the reporter.  Part III will demonstrate that decoupling the 
rights of reporter and source will undermine the justification for a reporter’s 
privilege for nonconfidential information, as well as obscure a crucial distinction 
between news operations and websites publishing anonymously leaked information 
such as Wikileaks.  This Note will conclude by arguing that the most current 
proposed federal shield bill, the Free Flow of Information Act of 2009, sets forth 
workable language that simultaneously strengthens the reporter’s privilege and 
frames the privilege as a public benefit, reflecting that the societal interest in 
protecting the reporter-source relationship is greater than the individual interests of 
either the reporter or the source.23 
I.  ANONYMOUS SPEECH AND THE REPORTER’S PRIVILEGE 
A.  THE FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT TO ANONYMOUS SPEECH 
The legal protections that online anonymous speakers enjoy today originate 
from a line of cases in which the Supreme Court identified a First Amendment 
interest in the anonymous publication of political pamphlets.24  In the first such 
case, the Supreme Court struck down a Los Angeles ordinance prohibiting the 
distribution of handbills that did not include the author’s name on the cover.25  The 
petitioner in this case was arrested and fined for violating the ordinance after he 
distributed handbills advocating a boycott against merchants who had allegedly 
engaged in racially discriminatory hiring practices.26  The petitioner had only 
included the name and address of the boycotting organization on the handbill, 
omitting his own name.27  While the state of California defended its disclosure law 
as a means to prevent false statements that might impact the public during 
elections, the Court struck down the ordinance as unduly restricting freedom of 
speech.28  In this and subsequent cases, the Court has deemed speaker identification 
requirements too blunt an instrument to achieve states’ antifraud goals.29 
 
 23. See S. 448, 111th Cong. (2009). 
 24. See, e.g., McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995) (holding unconstitutional 
an Ohio law against distributing anonymous campaign literature); Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 
(1960) (holding unconstitutional an ordinance which barred distribution of unsigned handbills).  See also 
Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150 (2002) (holding 
unconstitutional a town ordinance which required individuals to register with the town before engaging 
in door-to-door advocacy). 
 25. Talley, 362 U.S. at 65. 
 26. Id. at 61. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. at 64. 
 29. See id. at 65; McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 357; Wachtower Bible, 536 U.S. at 166 (2002) (holding 
that “the requirement that a canvasser must be identified in a permit application filed in the mayor's 
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Nevertheless the Supreme Court has indicated that, at least in the context of 
referendum petitions, a state’s interest in preventing fraud is strong enough to 
uphold a disclosure law against First Amendment scrutiny.30  In Doe No. 1 v. Reed, 
the Court found that Washington state’s interest in preserving the integrity of its 
electoral process was sufficient to uphold its Public Records Act (PRA), which 
required public disclosure of the signatories to referendum petitions.31  Petitioner 
Protect Marriage Washington initiated the suit to enjoin the disclosure of the 
signatories to a petition that opposed the expansion of rights for same sex domestic 
partners.32  The Court addressed only the petitioners’ facial challenge to the Act, 
meaning that the law remained subject to challenge as applied to particular facts, 
but did not violate the First Amendment as written.33  It was thus left to the District 
Court to determine whether the PRA was unconstitutional as applied to the 
petitioners, an inquiry that would turn on whether the petitioners can demonstrate 
“a reasonable probability that the compelled disclosure . . . will subject them to 
threats, harassment, or reprisals . . . .”34  This test, which the Supreme Court has 
formulated to determine whether the interest in preserving anonymity outweighs a 
compelling state interest in disclosure, grew out of a seminal case that upheld the 
right of the NAACP to refuse to disclose the identities of its members to the 
Alabama State Attorney General.35  Indeed, two years before the Court recognized 
a distinct right to publish handbills anonymously, it held that the right to freedom 
of association immunized the NAACP from state scrutiny of its membership lists, 
where the NAACP demonstrated that its members had suffered reprisals after 
revelation of their membership.36 
The disclosure law cases illustrate that, while not absolute, freedom of speech 
under the First Amendment encompasses an individual’s decision to speak 
anonymously on political issues.37  More broadly, the Court has recognized a First 
Amendment right for any author—political or otherwise—to publish anonymously, 
stating that “at least in the field of literary endeavor, the interest in having 
 
office and available for public inspection necessarily results in a surrender of that anonymity” protected 
by the First Amendment). 
 30. Doe #1 v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811 (2010) (finding a state’s interest in preserving the integrity of 
the electoral process to be a “sufficiently important governmental interest” to uphold a disclosure 
requirement in referendum petitions against First Amendment scrutiny). 
 31. Id. at 2815, 2821. 
 32. Id. at 2813. 
 33. Id. at 2815. 
 34. Id. at 2820. 
 35. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 74 (1976) (announcing the test).  See also NAACP v. Ala., 357 
U.S. 449 (1958). 
 36. NAACP, 557 U.S. at 466. 
 37. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 342 (1995) (stating that “an author’s 
decision to remain anonymous, like other decisions concerning omissions or additions to the content of a 
publication, is an aspect of the freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment”).  But see Reed, 
130 S. Ct. at 2831 n.4 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“Justice Scalia conceives of the issue as a right to 
anonymous speech . . . . But our decision in McIntyre posited no such freewheeling right . . . . The right 
[to freedom of speech] . . . is the right to speak, not the right to speak without being fined or the right to 
speak anonymously.”). 
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anonymous works enter the marketplace of ideas unquestionably outweighs any 
public interest in requiring disclosure as a condition of entry.”38  With the advent of 
the Internet as a new speech medium, the Court extended full First Amendment 
protection to online speech in Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union.39  Indeed, 
the Court evoked the spirit of its handbill cases when describing the immense 
opportunity for individual expression afforded by the Internet:  “Through the use of 
chat rooms, any person with a phone line can become a town crier with a voice that 
resonates farther than it could from any soapbox.  Through the use of Web pages, 
mail exploders, and newsgroups, the same individual can become a pamphleteer.”40  
It is out of this legal and technological progression—from the recognition that 
disclosure laws regulating political publications implicate First Amendment rights, 
to the recognition of a right to anonymous publication generally, and finally to the 
recognition that First Amendment protections apply to online speech—that the case 
law surrounding online poster anonymity has developed.41 
In the online poster context, the interest that competes with a speaker’s First 
Amendment right to anonymity is not the state’s power to impose disclosure 
requirements on speakers, but rather a private party’s power to subpoena the 
identity of an online speaker from an ISP or host website, in order either to name 
the poster as a libel defendant or to call him or her as a witness in another civil or 
criminal proceeding.42  When presented with a motion to quash such a subpoena, 
courts have uniformly held that the subpoenaing party must show his claim has 
merit in order to defeat the motion and obtain the requested information.43  Courts 
have agreed that, at a minimum, those seeking to make use of compulsory 
 
 38. McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 342. 
 39. 521 U.S. 844 (1997). 
 40. Id. at 870.  See also Lee Tien, Who’s Afraid of Anonymous Speech?  McIntyre and the 
Internet, 75 OR. L. REV. 117, 129, 136 (1996) (discussing the McIntyre court’s concern for protecting 
“cheap speech” and the Internet as the new cheap speech medium). 
 41. See, e.g., Krinsky v. Doe, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d 231, 238–39 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (holding that 
judicial recognition of the constitutional right to publish anonymously has a long-standing tradition); In 
re Subpoena Duces Tecum to Am. Online, Inc., No. 40570, 2000 WL 1210372, at *7 (Va. Cir. Ct. Jan. 
31, 2000) (“before a court abridges the First Amendment right of a person to communicate anonymously 
on the Internet, a showing, sufficient to enable the court to determine that a true, rather than perceived, 
cause of action may exist, must be made.”). 
 42. See Ashley I. Kissinger & Katherine Larsen, Untangling the Legal Labyrinth:  Protections for 
Anonymous Online Speech, 13 No. 9 J. INTERNET L. 1, 16 (2010) [hereinafter Untangling the Legal 
Labyrinth] (stating that the most frequent way a plaintiff seeks the identity of an anonymous poster is to 
“commence[] a lawsuit against a Jane or John Doe defendant and then move[] for issuance of a pre-
service discovery subpoena on the owner of the Web site on which the offending material was posted, 
the anonymous poster’s Internet service provider (ISP), or both”). 
 43. See, e.g., Krinsky, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 245 (holding that in California a plaintiff must make a 
prima facie showing of the elements of libel to overcome a defendant’s motion to quash a subpoena for 
his identity); Doe No. 1 v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 460 (Del. 2005) (holding that in Delaware, a plaintiff 
must support his defamation claim with facts sufficient to defeat a summary judgment motion in order to 
obtain the identify of an anonymous defendant through the compulsory discovery process); Dendrite 
Int’l. Inc. v. Doe No. 3, 775 A.2d 756, 760 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) (holding that, among other 
requirements, a plaintiff must make a prima facie showing of each element of its cause of action prior to 
a court ordering the disclosure of the identity of the unnamed defendant); Am. Online, No. 40570, 2000 
WL 1210372, at *7. 
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discovery to unmask an online poster cannot arbitrarily abridge the First 
Amendment anonymity rights of the poster with “fishing expeditions.”44 
From this point of commonality, however, courts over the past decade have 
forged an array of tests that may impose additional requirements on those seeking 
to identify a poster.45  The state-by-state, and even court-by-court, divergence in 
legal standards applied to subpoenas designed to identify online posters is due in 
part to the absence of a controlling standard announced by the Supreme Court or by 
any federal circuit court.46  The variance is also a natural result of different courts’ 
application of the First Amendment balancing test, which calls for a balancing of 
the First Amendment rights of the speaker with the subpoenaing party’s right to 
legal redress.47  The least burdensome of these tests, the so-called “good faith” 
standard, requires only that the party requesting the subpoena “has a legitimate, 
good faith basis” for the legal claim that is the impetus for the subpoena, and that 
the information requested is “centrally needed” to advance that claim.48  The 
“motion to dismiss” standard, articulated in Columbia Insurance Co. v. 
Seescandy.com, requires the plaintiff to:  (1) identify the anonymous party with 
sufficient specificity such that a court may determine whether the defendant is a 
real person or entity who could be sued in federal court; (2) identify all previous 
steps taken to locate the defendant; and (3) establish that his suit against the 
anonymous defendant could withstand a motion to dismiss.49  As the Seescandy 
case concerned not expressive speech but speech pertaining to intellectual property 
rights, it remains to be seen whether courts will limit the motion to dismiss standard 
 
 44. See Recent Developments 2007–2008, supra note 2, at 156 (stating that the prima facie 
showing requirement in the anonymous poster cases serves to prove that a plaintiff “is not merely 
harassing a poster or trying to stifle legitimate criticism”).  One court has gone even further, analogizing 
the scrutiny that courts must give preservice discovery request to that given to the government’s process 
of obtaining warrants in a criminal investigation: 
Pre-service discovery is akin to the process used during criminal investigations to obtain 
warrants.  The requirement that the government show probable cause is, in part, a protection 
against the misuse of ex parte procedures to invade the privacy of one who has done no wrong.  
A similar requirement is necessary here [in pre-service discovery of the identity of an 
anonymous poster] to prevent abuse of this extraordinary application of the discovery process 
and to ensure that the plaintiff has standing to pursue an action against defendant. 
Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573, 579–80. (N.D. Cal. 1999). 
 45. See Ashley I. Kissinger & Katharine Larsen, Protections for Anonymous Online Speech, in 
COMMUNICATIONS LAW IN THE DIGITAL AGE 2011 815, 826–39 (PLI Practice, Course Handbook, 2011) 
(surveying legal protections for anonymous online speakers and listing over ten distinct tests for 
unmasking an anonymous poster). 
 46. See Untangling the Legal Labyrinth, supra note 42, at 17 (noting the lack of federal appellate 
cases announcing a standard to balance the rights of online speakers with parties seeking to unmask 
them in order to obtain redress). 
 47. See Am. Online, No. 40570, 2000 WL 1210372, at *7 (noting that “what is sufficient to plead 
a prima facie case varies from state to state, and sometimes, from court to court,” leading to a lack of 
uniformity among state standards which incorporate a prima facie showing requirement into their tests 
for unmasking online posters). 
 48. Am. Online, No. 40570, 2000 WL 1210372, at *8.  See also Untangling the Legal Labyrinth, 
supra note 42, at 21 (outlining the “good faith test”). 
 49. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. at 578–79. 
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to the nonexpressive speech context.50 
Under the more restrictive “summary judgment” standard, a plaintiff must:  (1) 
notify the anonymous poster that he is the subject of a subpoena, in some 
circumstances by posting the notification on the same message board upon which 
the original posting at issue appeared; (2) withhold action to afford the anonymous 
defendant a reasonable opportunity to file and serve opposition to the application; 
and (3) support his defamation claim with facts sufficient to defeat a summary 
judgment motion.51  The Dendrite standard noted above is the most restrictive 
standard, requiring in addition to the three components of the summary judgment 
standard that (4) plaintiffs set forth the exact anonymous statements which they 
allege constitute actionable speech, and (5) the court “balance the defendant’s First 
Amendment right of anonymous free speech against the strength of the prima facie 
case presented and the necessity for the disclosure of the anonymous defendant’s 
identity to allow the plaintiff to proceed.”52  In cases concerning expressive speech, 
where the plaintiff is suing the online poster for defamation, the summary judgment 
and Dendrite tests are the prevailing standards.53  Courts differ as to whether they 
will apply the same standard to cases where the plaintiff seeks to name the 
anonymous individual in order to call him or her as a nonparty witness.54 
1.  Theoretical Underpinnings of the Right to Anonymous Speech 
In each of the primary Supreme Court cases striking down disclosure laws—
Talley v. California and McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission—the Court’s 
conclusion that the First Amendment affords a right to anonymous publication rests 
upon two pillars:  (1) acknowledgement that anonymous political speech has been a 
historically important force in our nation’s political development and (2) concern 
that forced identification may chill speech on public issues for fear of reprisal.55  
Both cases cite a national “tradition of anonymity in the advocacy of political 
causes,” from the pre-Revolutionary War Letters of Junius to the Federalist Papers, 
authored by James Madison, Alexander Hamilton and John Jay, but published 
under the pseudonym “Publius.”56  In McIntyre, the Court opined that the right to 
anonymous publication plays an important role in the American constitutional 
scheme, proclaiming that “[a]nonymity is a shield from the tyranny of the 
majority . . . . It thus exemplifies the purpose behind the Bill of Rights, and of the 
First Amendment in particular:  to protect unpopular individuals from retaliation—
 
 50. See Ashley I. Kissinger & Katharine Larsen, Protections for Anonymous Online Speech, in 
COMMUNICATIONS LAW IN THE DIGITAL AGE 2011 815, 832–34 (PLI Practice, Course Handbook, 
2011). 
 51. Cahill, 884 A.2d at 460–61. 
 52. Dendrite Int’l. Inc. v. Doe No. 3, 775 A.2d 756, 760–61 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001). 
 53. See Untangling the Legal Labyrinth, supra note 42, at 18. 
 54. See id. 
 55. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 344, 341–42 (1995); Talley v. California, 362 
U.S. 60, 64–65 (1960). 
 56. McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 343 n.6; Talley, 362 U.S. at 65. 
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and their ideas from suppression—at the hand of an intolerant society.”57  The 
Court has subsequently cited McIntyre to support the broader proposition that 
anonymity is an aspect of the First Amendment theory of speaker autonomy, a 
principle that affords authors an editorial right to determine the content of their 
speech, including omissions.58 
Justice Thomas, in his concurring opinion in McIntyre, undertook an originalist 
analysis of whether “freedom of speech, or of the press” was understood by the 
Framers to entail a right to publish anonymously, ultimately concluding that the 
First Amendment was in fact intended to encompass a right to anonymous political 
speech.59  Notably, two of the historical incidents that Thomas cites in support of 
an original right to anonymity are cases in which newspaper editors refused to 
reveal the identities of pseudonymously published articles critical of the 
government.60  In these cases, members of the Continental Congress and the New 
Jersey State Assembly defended the editors’ refusal in the name of freedom of the 
press.61 
Despite the force of the majority opinions in Talley and McIntyre proclaiming 
the existence of a First Amendment right to anonymous publication, each opinion 
drew a dissent that declaimed the existence of any generalized right to anonymity 
in the absence of a demonstrated threat of reprisal to the speaker.62  In Talley, 
Justice Clark objected that “[t]he Constitution says nothing about freedom of 
anonymous speech,” and that “the record is barren of any claim, much less proof, 
that [Talley] will suffer any injury whatever by identifying the handbill with his 
name.”63  Justice Scalia in McIntyre opposed not only the notion that there is an 
original right to anonymous publication under the Constitution but also the 
majority’s discourse on anonymity as central to the marketplace of ideas, arguing 
that anonymous publication “facilitates wrong by eliminating accountability, which 
is ordinarily the very purpose of the anonymity.”64  The proliferation of online 
message boards and comment functions on news websites has only sharpened the 
debate over the social utility of anonymous speech, with one prominent 
commentator advocating a “traceable anonymity” regime whereby ISPs and 
 
 57. 514 U.S. at 357. 
 58. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 573 (1995) (citing 
McIntyre as illustrating “th[e] general rule, that the speaker has the right to tailor the speech, applies not 
only to expressions of value, opinion, or endorsement, but equally to statements of fact the speaker 
would rather avoid.”).  See also Tien, supra note 40, at 131–36 (discussing Hurley and McIntyre as 
instances of the principle of speaker autonomy). 
 59. 514 U.S. at 359, 371 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 60. Id. at 361–62. (Thomas, J., concurring) (recounting controversy over the Continental 
Congress’ attempt in 1779 to discover the identity of the author of an article in the Pennsylvania Packet, 
which several members of the Congress itself thwarted, and the New Jersey State Legislature’s attempt 
to uncover the identity of an anonymous critic “Cincinnatus,” only to be thwarted by a State Assembly 
vote that Cincinnatus’ anonymity was protected by the freedom of the press). 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 379, 385 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Talley, 362 U.S. at 70 (Clark, J., dissenting). 
 63. 362 U.S. at 69–70 (Clark, J., dissenting). 
 64. 514 U.S. at 385 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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website operators would be required to collect visitors’ IP addresses to increase 
accountability for online harassment.65  However, as the Court has noted, the 
federal and state governments do not have the power to punish certain utterances 
“in order to maintain what they regard as a suitable level of discourse within the 
body politic.”66 
B.  THE REPORTER’S PRIVILEGE 
The journalistic merit of relying on confidential sources is not above 
controversy within the profession.67  However, since at least the Eighteenth 
Century, American history has been littered with controversies in which newspaper 
editors refused to disclose the identity of their pseudonymous contributors, and 
reporters refused to divulge the identity of their sources in the name of freedom of 
the press.68  Statutory recognition of a reporter’s privilege in the United States did 
not originate until 1896, when Maryland enacted the nation’s first reporter’s shield 
statute.69  The Maryland statute provided—and still provides—an absolute shield to 
reporters from forced disclosure of their confidential sources, even when 
subpoenaed to testify before a grand jury.70  Thirty-eight states have since followed 
Maryland’s lead, with Kansas and Wisconsin being the latest states to enact shield 
laws.71  Unlike Maryland’s statute, however, most state shield laws provide a 
“qualified,” rather than an “absolute,” reporter’s privilege.72  Florida’s journalist 
 
 65. Daniel Keats Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 89 B.U. L. REV. 61, 123 (2009). 
 66. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 23 (1971).  See also Tien, supra note 40, at 140–42. 
 67. See Alicia C. Shepard, Anonymous Sources, AM. JOURNALISM REV., Dec. 1994, at 21–24. 
 68. See, e.g., McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 361–62 (Thomas, J., concurring); Telnikoff v. Matusevitch, 
702 A.2d 230, 243 (Md. 1997) (recounting that in 1777 the Maryland House of Delegates admonished 
the Whig Club of Baltimore for demanding revelation of the identity of the author of a pro-Tory 
editorial).  The Maryland reporter’s shield statute was passed in reaction to a case in which a Baltimore 
Sun reporter spent five days in jail for refusing to testify before a grand jury about his confidential 
sources.  See J.S. Bainbridge, Jr., Subpoenaing the Press, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1, 1988, at 72. 
 69. See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9–112 (West 2011); Telnikoff, 702 A.2d at 244 
(stating that Maryland was the first state in the union to adopt a reporter’s shield statute). 
 70. The original statute provided: 
That no person engaged in, connected with or employed on a newspaper or journal shall be 
compelled to disclose in any legal proceeding or trial, or before any committee of the legislature 
or elsewhere, the source of any news or information procured or obtained by him for and 
published in the newspaper on and in which he is engaged, connected with or employed. 
See Telnikoff, 702 A.2d at 244 (citing the original statute).  The current reporter’s shield statute provides, 
in part, that: 
any judicial, legislative, or administrative body, or any body that has the power to issue 
subpoenas may not compel any person described in subsection (b) of this section to disclose: (1) 
The source of any news or information procured by the person while employed by the news 
media, whether or not the source has been promised confidentiality. . . . 
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9–112. 
 71. James C. Goodale et. al., Reporter’s Privilege:  Recent Developments 2009–2010, in 
COMMUNICATIONS LAW IN THE DIGITAL AGE 2010 151, 157 (PLI Practice, Course Handbook, 2010) 
[hereinafter Recent Developments 2009–2010]. 
 72. See THE REPORTER’S PRIVILEGE COMPENDIUM, http://www.rcfp.org/privilege/ (click “select 
all states” and compare “B. Absolute or Qualified Privilege”; then click “Compare”) (last visited May 
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privilege statute provides a typical model of a qualified privilege statute.  To 
overcome the privilege, a party must show that:  “(a) [t]he information is relevant 
and material to unresolved issues that have been raised in the proceeding for which 
the information is sought; (b) [t]he information cannot be obtained from alternative 
sources; and (c) [a] compelling interest exists for requiring disclosure of the 
information.”73  States that have not enacted shield laws may provide common law 
protection to journalists from forced disclosure of their sources.74  Reporters may 
also receive the benefit of a state shield law in federal court, as federal courts 
adjudicating a civil case arising under state law must apply the applicable state law 
of evidentiary privilege.75  Thus, in a state law case, a reporter seeking to withhold 
the identity of a confidential source may claim protection under state shield law, 
the state constitution or state common law. 
In a case arising under federal law, a journalist’s options are less certain.  While 
the Court has unambiguously recognized a First Amendment right to anonymous 
speech, the extent to which the First Amendment may be invoked to protect the 
identity of a confidential news source varies from circuit to circuit.  The Supreme 
Court has only once considered whether the First Amendment requires recognition 
of a privilege for reporters—in Branzburg v. Hayes.76  The Court in Branzburg 
held that there is no First Amendment privilege for reporters to refuse to testify 
before a grand jury, even where this testimony may require a reporter to reveal the 
identity of a confidential source.77  However, the Court emphasized that its holding 
was limited to the issue of grand jury testimony.78  Whether the First Amendment 
provides for a reporter’s privilege more broadly is an issue seemingly left open by 
Justice White’s majority opinion, while discussed favorably in Justice Powell’s 
concurrence.79  Most circuit courts, except the Sixth and Seventh Circuits, have 
 
11, 2011) (listing whether a state’s reporter’s privilege is qualified or absolute).  See also CAREY 
LENNING & HENRY COHEN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 32806, JOURNALISTS’ PRIVILEGE TO 
WITHHOLD INFORMATION IN JUDICIAL AND OTHER PROCEEDINGS:   STATE SHIELD STATUTES (2005) 
(summarizing trends across state shield laws, with an appendix containing the full text of all state shield 
laws enacted before 2005). 
 73. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 90.5015(2)(a–c) (West 2011). 
 74. See, e.g., Idaho v. Kiss, 700 P.2d 40, 44–46 (Idaho 1985); Ayash v. Dana-Farber Cancer Inst., 
822 N.E.2d 667, 696 n.33 (Mass. 2005) (stating that Massachusetts, which lacks a state shield statute, 
has “recognized that values underlying the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and art. 
16 of the Amendments to the Massachusetts Constitution may give rise to a common-law privilege that 
would allow a news reporter to refuse to reveal his sources”). 
 75. FED. R. EVID. 501. 
 76. 408 U.S. 665 (1972). 
 77. Id. at 708. 
 78. Id. at 682 (“The sole issue before us is the obligation of reporters to respond to grand jury 
subpoenas as other citizens do and to answer questions relevant to an investigation into the commission 
of crime.”). 
 79. Id. at 707, 710.  Justice White in his majority opinion clarified that “news gathering is not 
without its First Amendment protections, and grand jury investigations if instituted or conducted other 
than in good faith, would pose wholly different issues for resolution under the First Amendment.”  Id. at 
707.  Justice Powell’s concurrence recognized a qualified reporter’s privilege, whereby “[t]he asserted 
claim to privilege should be judged on its facts by the striking of a proper balance between freedom of 
the press and the obligation of all citizens to give relevant testimony with respect to criminal conduct.” 
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interpreted Branzburg to recognize some degree of First Amendment privilege for 
reporters outside of the grand jury context.80 
In the absence of assured First Amendment protection, reporters seeking to 
avoid testifying in federal criminal proceedings regarding the identity of a source 
have recently raised the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination as a 
shield.81  For example, in December 2008, Detroit Free Press reporter David 
Ashenfelter invoked the Fifth Amendment at a deposition, refusing to reveal the 
source that named Assistant United States Attorney Richard Convertino as the 
target of a Department of Justice investigation for misconduct in connection with a 
terrorism prosecution.82  In April 2009, after a two year battle between Convertino 
and Ashenfelter, a Michigan District Court found for Ashenfelter, concluding that, 
under the Fifth Amendment, he could not be forced to appear for a criminal 
deposition to identify his sources.83  However a reporter may only invoke the Fifth 
Amendment right against self-incrimination where a prosecutor has not already 
provided him or her with immunity from any criminal prosecution that may result 
from his testimony.84 
1.  Theoretical Underpinnings of the Reporter’s Privilege 
While both the McIntyre majority opinion and Justice Thomas’ concurrence 
underscore the historic underpinnings of the First Amendment right to anonymous 
speech, the Court in Branzburg rejected the idea that the First Amendment has also 
historically shielded confidential sources:  “From the beginning of our country the 
press has operated without constitutional protection for press informants, and the 
press has flourished.”85  The very structure of this controversial statement by the 
Court typifies legal discourse on the reporter’s privilege in that, while the 
individual rights of the reporter and source may be referenced, justification for the 
privilege ultimately rests upon concern for the vitality of the press.  For example, 
dissenting Justice Stewart espoused the existence of a constitutional right for 
 
Id. at 710. 
 80. See Recent Developments 2009–2010, supra note 71, at 173, 181 n.2 (rounding up cases from 
the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Eight, Ninth, Tenth and D.C. Circuits recognizing a First 
Amendment reporter’s privilege outside of the grand jury context).  But see McKevitt v. Palasch, 339 
F.3d 530, 532–33 (7th Cir. 2003) (suggesting that Branzburg did not recognize a First Amendment 
privilege for nonconfidential information, and potentially casting doubt on whether the First 
Amendment may privilege confidential information, even when there is a concern for “harassment, 
burden, [or] using the press as an investigative arm of the government . . . .”); Convertino v. U.S. Dep’t 
of Justice, No. 07-CV-13842, 2008 WL 4104347, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 28, 2008) (citing Store 
Commc’ns, Inc. v. Giovan, 810 F.2d 580, 584–86 (6th Cir. 1987), for the proposition that “the Sixth 
Circuit has explicitly declined to recognize a qualified First Amendment privilege for reporters”). 
 81. See Samantha Frederickson, Leaning on the Fifth, THE NEWS MEDIA & THE LAW, Winter 
2009, at 23. 
 82. Id. 
 83. See James C. Goodale et. al., Reporter’s Privilege:  Recent Developments 2008–2009, in 
COMMUNICATIONS LAW IN THE DIGITAL AGE 2009 113, 120 (PLI, Practice, Course Handbook, 2009). 
 84. See Leaning on the Fifth, supra note 81 at 24. 
 85. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 698–99.  See also discussion supra pp. 127–29. 
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reporters to maintain the confidentiality of their sources, describing this right as 
stemming “from the broad societal interest in a full and free flow of information to 
the public.”86  Another example of a public interest formulation in support of the 
reporter’s privilege appears in the case of Garland v. Torre, which predates 
Branzburg and marks the first time that a reporter asserted a testimonial privilege 
grounded in the First Amendment.87  In Garland, a writer for the New York Herald 
Tribune refused, during her deposition, to reveal the identity of an unnamed 
“network executive” to whom she had attributed several statements about the 
actress Judy Garland.88  The Second Circuit stated that it accepted “the hypothesis 
that compulsory disclosure of a journalist’s confidential sources of information 
may entail an abridgment of press freedom by imposing some limitation upon the 
availability of news,” but ultimately found that the duty of a witness to testify in 
court necessarily abridges the First Amendment freedom of all witnesses, reporters 
or otherwise, “to choose whether to speak or be silent . . . .”89  Thus to the extent 
that the Second Circuit acknowledged a First Amendment interest against forced 
disclosure of confidential sources, the interest derived from the chilling effect that 
such a disclosure would have on the dissemination of news to the public.90 
The disclosure cases weigh very seriously the threat that a chilling effect on 
political speech may result from compelled identification in handbill distribution, 
and the “free flow of information” rationale for a reporter’s privilege likewise links 
the reporter’s ability to disseminate news with the continued willingness of 
confidential sources to provide newsworthy information.  Yet the Court in 
Branzburg was quite equivocal when evaluating whether a chilling effect would in 
fact result from subjecting reporters to grand jury subpoena, describing a 
“consequential, but uncertain, burden on news gathering that is said to result from 
insisting that reporters, like other citizens, respond to relevant questions . . . .”91  It 
further referred to the wide-ranging results of a study in which daily newspaper 
editors were asked to estimate how many of their stories have been based on 
information received in confidence, and discussed the methodological difficulty of 
measuring the extent to which informants are actually deterred by the knowledge 
that the press is subject to subpoenas.92 
Since Branzburg, professional journalists and their advocates have repeatedly 
written and testified on the importance of confidential sources to reporting.93  They 
 
 86. Id. at 725 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
 87. 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1958).  See also Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 685–86 (describing Garland as 
the first case in which a reporter asserted a First Amendment right to protect his confidential sources). 
 88. Garland, 259 F.2d at 547. 
 89. Id. at 548–49. 
 90. Id. at 547–48. 
 91. 408 U.S. at 690–91. 
 92. Id. at 693–95. 
 93. See RonNell Andersen Jones, Avalanche or Undue Alarm?  An Empirical Study of Subpoenas 
Received by the News Media, 93 MINN. L. REV. 585, 594–625 (2008) (chronicling legislative efforts 
from 1929 to 2008 to enact a federal reporter’s privilege and the news media’s testimony in support of 
those efforts).  See also Steven D. Zansberg, The Empirical Case:  Proving The Need for the Privilege, 2 
MEDIA LAW RESOURCE CENTER BULL. 145, 149 (2004), available at http:// 
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have testified that the full scope of news stories that benefit from the insight of 
confidential sources is underestimated, as these sources provide and verify 
information not only for investigative pieces, but also elucidate the significance of 
a day’s news events.94  The public debate that Branzburg engendered regarding the 
strength of the link between reporters’ ability to gather news and their ability to 
rely on confidential sources stands in stark contrast to the Talley and McIntyre 
Courts’ presumption of a chilling effect from forced disclosure, though dissenting 
opinions in each case criticized the majority’s failure to find that the disclosure 
would subject the petitioner to any actual harm.95 
2.  The Reporter-Source Relationship 
While the public benefit of news dissemination has been advanced as the 
primary justification for the reporter’s privilege, the Supreme Court has examined 
the nature of the private interests at stake in the reporter-source compact.  In Cohen 
v. Cowles Media Co., the Court treated the issue of whether a confidential source 
can bring state law breach of contract and promissory estoppel claims against a 
reporter for publishing a source’s name despite having promised the source 
confidentiality.96  While the defendant newspaper in the case argued that the First 
Amendment prohibited such claims, the Court found that where the state’s law of 
promissory estoppel is one of general applicability, the First Amendment does not 
forbid its application to the press.97  In the wake of Cohen, Minnesota, Georgia, and 
New York have permitted application of their state law of breach of contract or 
promissory estoppel to sanction a reporter’s breach of confidentiality.98 
On remand of the Cohen case itself, the Minnesota Supreme Court described the 
reporter-source compact as a “special ethical relationship” and a “moral 
commitment,” that nonetheless does not give rise to a binding legal contract.99  It 
declined to imply a contract under a promissory estoppel theory, announcing that it 
must “balance the constitutional rights of a free press against the common law 
interest in protecting a promise of anonymity.”100  The court left open the 
possibility that there may be circumstances in which “the state’s interest in 
 
www.medialaw.org/Content/NavigationMenu/Publications1/MLRC_Bulletin/Bulletin_ Archive/2004-
2WhitePaper.pdf (demonstrating reporters’ reliance on confidential sources and unpublished source 
materials in four contexts:  (1) government reporting; (2) private sector; (3) non-confidential sources; 
and (4) military affairs). 
 94. See Free Flow of Information Act of 2007:  Hearing on H.R. 2102 Before the H. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 39–41 (2007) (statement of Lee Levine, Partner, Levine Sullivan Koch & 
Schulz, L.L.P. and Adjunct Professor, Georgetown University Law Center). 
 95. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 379 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Talley 
v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 69 (1960) (Clark, J., dissenting). 
 96. 501 U.S. 663 (1991). 
 97. Id. at 670. 
 98. James C. Goodale et. al., Reporter’s Privilege in COMMUNICATIONS LAW IN THE DIGITAL 
AGE 2011 239, 285 n. 204 & 205 (PLI Practice, Course Handbook, 2011) [hereinafter Reporter’s 
Privilege 2011] (noting that three states have not permitted such suits). 
 99. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 457 N.W.2d 199, 203 (Minn. 1990). 
 100. Id. at 205. 
(5) Hanamirian 1/26/2012  1:48 PM 
134 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF LAW & THE ARTS [35:1 
enforcing the promise to the source outweighs [the press’] First Amendment” 
interests, though the “outed” source did not prevail in that case.101  Subsequently 
the District of Columbia, applying Virginia state law, agreed with Minnesota that a 
confidential source relationship creates a moral rather than contractual 
obligation.102  It rejected a breach of contract claim brought by a confidential 
source, where the source admitted to lying to the defendant reporter.103 
The Cohen promissory estoppel analysis adds a curious dimension to the 
reporter-source relationship, by citing a potential “state interest” in the enforcement 
of a reporter’s promise to a source, which may trump the interests of the reporter.  
Where legal recognition of the reporter-source relationship stems from the public 
interest value of news, rather than direct concern for the rights of the source, and 
where states recognizing a reporter’s privilege have also recognized that the 
reporter alone may waive the privilege, in what sense may a state have an 
independent interest in enforcing the confidentiality compact?  The case is difficult 
to synthesize with the rationale underlying the reporter’s privilege, unless 
interpreted as standing for the proposition that the public interest, as protected by 
the state, is always paramount in the reporter-source relationship, such that the 
public interest in compensating sources for breach of confidentiality may 
predominate over the interests of the reporter. 
II.  KEY CASES 
In order to ascertain whether reframing the reporter’s privilege as the First 
Amendment right of the source to remain anonymous, rather than the right of the 
press to fulfill its newsgathering function, strengthens the reporter’s privilege, it 
must first be demonstrated that the anonymous speaker cases in fact provide a more 
protective model.  A recent New Hampshire Supreme Court opinion, juxtaposing 
the Dendrite standard with the state’s qualified reporter’s privilege analysis, 
demonstrates that, at least in the core area of defamation cases, anonymous posters 
may have the legal upper hand.104  In that case, the company Mortgage Specialists 
subpoenaed a website, Implode-Explode, which ranks and critiques the 
performance of mortgage lenders, seeking to force the website to disclose (1) the 
identity of an unnamed individual who had leaked Mortgage Specialists’ 2007 loan 
figures, in the form of a chart, to the website, which the site subsequently posted, 
and (2) the identity of an anonymous poster to the website, where Mortgage 
Specialists sought to name the poster as a libel defendant for statements made 
against the company.105 
The court held that the leak-publishing website need not automatically turn over 
the identity of the leaker, because it extended qualified reporter’s privilege 
 
 101. Id. 
 102. Steele v. Iskifoff, 130 F. Supp. 2d 23, 31 (D.D.C. 2000). 
 103. Id. at 33. 
 104. Mortg. Specialists, Inc. v. Implode-Explode Heavy Indus., Inc., 999 A.2d 184 (N.H. 2010). 
 105. Id. at 188. 
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protection to the website under the New Hampshire state constitution.106  The 
holding touches on the interesting issue of what websites may be categorized as 
news organizations in order to claim reporter’s privilege protection.  Within the 
scope of this Note, however, the court’s decision is of interest because of the way 
in which it differentiated New Hampshire’s reporter’s privilege analysis from the 
state’s test to unmask anonymous online speakers.  In considering Mortgage 
Specialists’ demand that Implode-Explode turn over the identify of the loan chart 
leaker, the court first set out to define a test for overcoming the state’s qualified 
reporter’s privilege in a civil suit where the press is a nonparty to a defamation 
action.107  The court adopted the First Circuit’s test in Bruno & Stillman Inc. v. 
Globe Newspaper Co., under which it would be required to balance:  (1) whether 
Mortgage Specialists’ claim for disclosure of the leaker is merely a pretense for 
exercising discovery powers as a fishing expedition; (2) whether there is a need for 
confidentiality between the journalist and the source; (3) the exhaustion of other 
non-confidential sources for the identity of the leaker; and (4) the importance of 
confidentiality to preserve the journalist’s continued newsgathering 
effectiveness.108  The court remanded for application of this test to the plaintiff’s 
subpoena to identify the leaker.109 
The anonymous commenter’s identity was subject to an entirely different set of 
protections.  There, the New Hampshire Supreme Court adopted the Dendrite test 
for unmasking online speakers.110  Under Dendrite, a plaintiff must (1) notify the 
anonymous posters that they are the subject of a subpoena; (2) identify the 
anonymous statements alleged to constitute actionable speech; and (3) state a prima 
facie cause of action against the anonymous defendants, producing sufficient 
evidence to support each element of its cause of action.111  If a plaintiff has met 
these threshold conditions, the court must then balance the defendant’s First 
Amendment right of anonymous free speech against the strength of the prima facie 
case presented, and the necessity for disclosure of the anonymous defendant’s 
identity to allow the plaintiff to properly proceed.112  As the test sets out, this 
balancing is necessary to accommodate both the well established First Amendment 
right to speak anonymously, and the right of the plaintiff to protect its proprietary 
interests and reputation.113  As with the reporter’s privilege analysis, the court 
remanded for application of the Dendrite test to the facts of the case.114 
Matching up the prongs of the Dendrite test to the elements of the state’s 
 
 106. Id. at 190. 
 107. Id. at 190. 
 108. Id. at 190–191 (adopting the qualified reporter’s privilege in Bruno & Stillman Inc. v. Globe 
Newspaper Co., 633 F.2d 583, 595–98 (1st Cir.1980)). 
 109. Id. at 191. 
 110. Id. at 193 (citing Dendrite Int’l, Inc. v. Doe No. 3, 775 A.2d 756 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
2001)). 
 111. Dendrite, 775 A.2d at 760. 
 112. Id. at 760–61. 
 113. Id. at 760. 
 114. Mortg. Specialists, 999 A.2d at 191. 
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reporter’s privilege analysis—which is typical of both other state and federal 
courts’ qualified reporter’s privilege analyses in the context of civil actions—the 
Dendrite test quickly emerges as the more protective standard.  The elements of the 
privilege analysis—setting forth a requirement for the plaintiff to reasonably 
exhaust sources other than the reporter for obtaining the identity sought, and to 
demonstrate the importance of the disclosure sought to his case—is readily 
encompassed within the last prong of Dendrite, in which the court will evaluate the 
need for the disclosure to allow the plaintiff’s case to proceed.  Yet the First 
Amendment protection afforded the anonymous poster under Dendrite assures, in 
addition, that even where the plaintiff has shown the requisite need for disclosure, 
that such a need will be subject to the additional check of the poster’s First 
Amendment rights.  By contrast, under the Bruno test the plaintiff’s need for 
disclosure of a source’s identity must be balanced with “the potential injury to the 
free flow of information that the disclosure portends.”115  As the contrast between 
the Supreme Court’s analysis of potential chilling effects in Talley/McIntyre and 
Branzburg demonstrates, recognition of a direct First Amendment interest may 
afford stronger anonymity protection than the assertion of a potential threat to 
newsgathering, especially where a specific evidentiary showing of harm may be 
necessary to convince a court of a threat to newsgathering.116  Further, the typical 
qualified reporter’s privilege analysis does not require the court to consider the 
impact of the disclosure on newsgathering.117  While the Dendrite standard, on 
balance, affords more protection to the subpoenaed party than the typical reporter’s 
privilege analysis, it must be acknowledged that this will not be the case in states 
that afford reporters an absolute privilege against civil subpoenas, and that not 
every state follows the Dendrite standard.  However, given the growing prevalence 
of Dendrite, and the fact that most states do not extend absolute privilege 
protection to reporters in civil actions, the lament that courts are more protective of 
anonymous posters than confidential sources rings true in the defamation 
context.118 
How, then, might a media lawyer utilize the anonymous poster precedent to the 
advantage of a news client in a confidential source case?  One Pennsylvania case 
shows a potential way forward.  In December 2008, a Pennsylvania federal court 
decided as a matter of first impression that a newspaper, The Pocono Record (the 
Record), had standing to assert the First Amendment rights of anonymous 
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commenters to its website.119  The commenters in question had responded to the 
paper’s coverage of a hostile work environment lawsuit brought by a local nurse 
against her former employer, the Pocono Medical Center (PMC).120  The plaintiff 
nurse, Brenda Enterline, claimed that a Dr. Cooks had sexually harassed her during 
her work in the emergency room.121  The newspaper received a flood of online 
commentary in response to its article—nearly sixty comments appeared the day the 
article was published.122  A poster using the pseudonym “ergirl” said that she had 
worked for PMC for more than ten years, and swore that, “Dr. Cooks never once in 
my entire time working there ever to my knowledge ever did anything that I would 
take ever as sexual harassment.” 123  One commenter proclaimed the opposite: 
“This doctor was so horrible, rude, inconsiderate and way off base!  I feel very bad 
for this nurse and believe every word of her story.”124  Three weeks after the 
article’s publication, Enterline subpoenaed the Record to identify eight of the 
posters, who appeared to have personal knowledge of Dr. Cooks and the work 
environment at PMC, in order to name them as potential witnesses in her sexual 
harassment case.125  The Record moved to quash the subpoena for requesting 
information protected by the First Amendment and the Pennsylvania reporter’s 
shield law.126 
Before the Enterline subpoena, newspapers in Oregon, Montana and Florida had 
already successfully quashed subpoenas for the IP addresses of anonymous online 
posters, where libel plaintiffs sought to name the posters as defendants, by claiming 
protection for the posters under their states’ shield laws.127  Enterline v. Pocono 
Medical Center broke ground in the genre of unmasking cases because the court 
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did not evaluate the applicability of Pennsylvania’s shield law to the case.128  
Instead, it focused on the Record’s First Amendment claim, in which the paper 
asserted the commenters’ rights to speak anonymously rather than its own privilege 
to withhold the identifying information.129  Judge Richard Caputo, applying the 
constitutional and prudential standing requirements to the Record’s claim to third 
party standing, held that “the relationship between The Pocono Record and readers 
posting in the Newspaper’s online forums is the type of relationship that allows The 
Pocono Record to assert the First Amendment rights of the anonymous 
commentators.”130 
In the absence of precedent squarely granting a newspaper third party standing 
to protect anonymous posters to its website, Judge Caputo relied on a D.C. Circuit 
opinion establishing that an ISP had standing to assert the anonymity rights of 
posters to its online forums, as well as a line of cases which recognized third party 
standing of proprietors and nonprofit organizations in “similar business/client 
relationships.”131  The Court found adequate injury in fact on the part of the 
newspaper to support third party standing, where “preventing the Record from 
asserting the First Amendment Rights of anonymous commentators will 
compromise the vitality of the newspaper’s online forums, sparking reduced reader 
interest and a corresponding decline in advertising revenues.”132  The Court 
acknowledged the obvious practical obstacles to the commenters to assert their own 
First Amendment rights, where they wished to remain anonymous.133  Finally, the 
Court found that the Record would zealously advocate for the commenters “in light 
of the Newspaper’s desire to maintain the trust of its readers and online 
commentators.”134 
The Court’s ready acknowledgement of injury in fact to the newspaper in 
Enterline, following the precedent in which ISPs successfully asserted economic 
injury in fact, challenges the Supreme Court’s statement in Branzburg that the 
potential chilling effect of requiring journalists to answer to grand jury subpoena 
poses a “consequential, but uncertain burden on news gathering . . . .”135  If courts 
readily accept that forced identification of anonymous commenters will chill this 
commentary, driving down hits to news websites and corresponding revenue, there 
is no logical reason why the potentially chilling effect of outing sources ought not 
to be treated more skeptically.  Like online commenters, confidential sources, too, 
face practical obstacles to defending their own anonymity rights.  And like the 
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defendant newspaper in Enterline, reporters and news organizations can be 
expected to engage in zealous advocacy on behalf of their confidential sources.  It 
may therefore be tempting for the media law community to look to Enterline as a 
means to reframe the reporter’s privilege analysis as the reporter’s assertion of third 
party standing to defend the anonymity rights of his source. 
III.  THE IMPORTANCE OF A RELATIONSHIP-BASED PRIVILEGE 
The primary drawback to refashioning the reporter’s privilege in the image of 
the anonymous poster cases is that, by advancing the anonymity interest of the 
source as paramount, the newly formulated privilege will obscure the public 
interest in effective newsgathering as a whole.  Jurisdictions that recognize a 
privilege for nonconfidential information gathered in the course of a journalist’s 
work rely on just this public interest rationale, as there is no anonymous party to be 
protected.  The First Circuit, for example, has described the compelled disclosure 
of nonconfidential source material as a “lurking and subtle threat” to the freedom of 
the press.136  In a case in which CBS moved to quash a grand jury subpoena to 
provide a court with the outtakes of a 60 Minutes episode, the Third Circuit 
recognized that compelled disclosure of the outtakes “may substantially undercut 
the public policy favoring the free flow of information to the public that is the 
foundation for the privilege.”137  The court reached this conclusion, even where the 
government had obtained waivers from its witnesses that the material may be aired 
in court, because the reporter’s privilege belongs to the news organization and was 
thus CBS’s privilege alone to waive.138  As protection for nonconfidential source 
material is still a developing area of media law, it will only benefit media advocates 
working toward the expansion of such protection to emphasize the public interest 
rationale for the reporter’s privilege, rather than the confidential source’s 
individuated anonymity right. 
Further, as recognized by the Cohen case, there is a distinctly moral dimension 
to the reporter-source relationship that may prove useful for journalistic 
organizations to emphasize in order to differentiate themselves from less 
discriminating “news” sources in the era of Wikileaks.139  Today, informants who 
wish to make their inside information on the workings of government publicly 
known have an equally viable choice between publishing this information on the 
Internet directly (either under a pseudonym or under the aegis of a Wikileaks-style 
site), or sharing this information with a reporter with whom they have a 
relationship.  It is clear that the federal legislature has no intention of protecting 
sites such as Wikileaks under any reporter’s shield, as it has explicitly amended the 
most recent draft of the proposed reporter’s shield statute to exclude protection for 
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confidential sources who have leaked classified information.140  Arguably, then, 
current public policy supports the idea that the reporter’s privilege should provide a 
level of protection sufficient to incentivize would-be informants to enter into a 
reporter-source relationship, rather than to take disclosure into their own hands.  If 
media advocates begin to argue that the interest in anonymous speech itself forms 
the heart of the privilege, this would seem to create the opposite incentive—driving 
disclosure to unmoderated mediums, such as message boards and Wikileaks-style 
sites. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
There is great potential for strengthening the reporter’s privilege without 
grafting the Dendrite test wholesale onto the privilege analysis.  The latest 
proposed federal shield bill, the Free Flow of Information Act of 2009, offers a 
public interest balancing test that is a step in the right direction.141  Explicitly 
referencing Justice Stewart’s dissenting opinion in Branzburg, which grounded a 
constitutional reporter’s privilege in “the broad societal interest in a full and free 
flow of information to the public,” the proposed bill provides a mandatory 
balancing test in which courts will have to evaluate whether “the public interest in 
compelling disclosure of the information or document involved outweighs the 
public interest in gathering or disseminating news or information.”142  This prong 
could potentially function as protection for confidential sources, which would be 
just as robust as the First Amendment balancing prong in Dendrite, if courts 
recognize that the public interest in effective newsgathering necessarily 
encompasses both a source’s First Amendment interest in entering into a 
confidential relationship, as well as a reporter’s interest in being able to maintain 
this relationship free of government incursion.  Indeed, at its heart, the lament that 
anonymous posters enjoy greater protection than journalists’ sources is a public 
interest critique, which turns upon the judgment that the speech enabled by online 
anonymity is less integral to civil discourse than the information that news sources 
provide within the context of a confidential relationship.  The paradox that arises 
from this insight is that the way in which media advocates can assure news sources 
the First Amendment protection they deserve is not by focusing on the rights of the 
sources themselves, but rather on the public interest in news dissemination that the 
reporter-source relationship is uniquely suited to advance. 
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